Monday, January 29, 2018

Healthcare Costs

A competitive marketplace, even one including democratic capitalism and intellectual property enforcement, would allow for a vast reduction in healthcare costs. Imagine that you break a limb, and in response to your injury, you could choose to visit an AMA-approved facility (assume for the purposes of example that it still exists) and wait for 5-75 minutes to fill in a form, have an X-ray, describe your adventure to a nurse, describe it again to a summoned doctor, and receive the setting and casting of said limb. You receive a notch on your chart, pay your co-pay, and go home. Your hospital experience may or may not include the participation in or potential observation of various experiences which you may or may not feel are necessary components of addressing such injury, magnified by various affirmations that you had assessed your experience correctly and that it wouldn't conflict with and/or affect other conditions which you did or didn't know you had.

Alternatively, posit that you can choose to visit a limb center, maybe wait up to six minutes for a technician to be available, then chew a painkiller and have the limb set, then decide whether you feel like visiting the optional casting shop or taking standard in white. Home in half an hour, costs a couple hundred bucks out-of-pocket or is free if you buy a comprehensive physical emergency insurance for a couple hundred a year, and life goes on.

A certain variety of consumer, prevalent nowadays, could imagine a preference for the former, based upon hypothetical afflictions with which the breaking of said limb might cause affections or alterations; the computer system at the limb center can provide a simple series of less than one minute Q&As that would cover all that, particularly if cross-linked to the computers at other similar centers, but presume it's disconnected and can refer you to a different place if it somehow affects some condition in ways in which the limb should not be set there (~0%).

The AMA does, rather shamelessly and violently, employ trauma monopolization over the market, to the extent that it takes massive religion-level inculcation to make consumers docile and accepting. "Of course it takes a minimum of ten years of training after high school to be an entry-level setting associate, duh." The establishment of violently enforced "treatment deserts" throughout monopoly territory is so commonplace as to not be worth recalling, let alone discussing, and the expansion of consideration of types of affected trauma treatments (almost all), from the mundane to the exotic, makes the problem expand to colossal proportions. A degree of familiarity with "doctor shortages," particularly if added to an understanding of the way that the consequential deaths related to (caused by) lacking approval for such procedures--a drug; a scan; a series of drugs or tests waiting a minute or a hundred twenty or weeks for potential use to be evaluated--leads to more of an understanding of how brutal the healthcare cartel is with its thralls, even quite wealthy ones. How many people have died months or years later from an advancing condition before some scanning machine--deliberately sold in small quantities to participating centers due to a variety of factors pricing care out of the imagined reach of the masses--can become available for an advanced priest to order its use, is a not insignificant, but historically non-verifiable, quantity. Procedure's granting of its own innocence is, this time, even retroactively responsible; the body count is, like cellular motivations for division, free of the threat of being proven. That sickening feeling of waiting to be addressed while something evil grows inside in uncertain ways can never be quantified, nor can the potential developments during unseen periods. We can, in 2018, look back at those burned or hanged by the governing church, rightly or wrongly, but we cannot track the suicides, irresponsible deaths related to (caused by) ostracism, et cetera, which, absent a time machine, are only speculatively, never provably, astronomically greater. Similarly, we cannot track the number of careless (not as the word is commonly employed now, but more literally) overpass visits of those who've heard that the lump wasn't caught in time, which remain indistinguishable, as contrasted with cancer-related deaths in approved facilities and related venues. The costs are not trackable, and as we grow better at tracking, so too do we grow better at disguising.

A hospital not staffed with a bloated quantity of employees whose function is primarily to fill time and distract "customers" from violating physicians' time stands in clear contrast to a hypothetical, disallowed set of job descriptions and treatment results from a million less-educated specialists. Perhaps an extremely overestimated (particularly when computers check all conflicts for even the loftiest priests anyway) ten thousand false diagnoses leading to death could be weighed against the likely hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by prearranged administrative bloat. The computer-mediated mistakes made by a legion of somewhat-dumb high school dropouts who still know how to search the computer and take apart a carburetor would actually number quite few, contrasted with the much higher number of deadly oversights routinely engaged in by a cozened class of modern priests who midnight-crammed for a week to barely pass a simplified trigonometry exam that they no longer remember. An aging population may join the strengthening computer in addressing some of these problems as a suitable distraction, yet this does nothing regarding justice for the already dead and currently dying, nor those who must perish on behalf of some form of witnessed scarcity to create a plausible veneer of studious in-demand-ness to correspond with cartel-rule as it exists or will exist.

Within the confines of such rule, ample opportunities present themselves for critique; even cartel-supporting paths of inquiry offer simple means of improving effectiveness which would, along the sideline, save a few million lives. More interesting at present is the unexplored question of pricing and availability. We may wonder, given a paucity of physicians, why each licensed, approved school can't graduate at least fifty more, rather than turning eminently eligible candidates away in yearly droves to become elementary science teachers; the trend of obedient hydras of medicine to expose to patients, extravagantly train, and offer concessatory diplomas and then licenses and employment based on appearance quotas both concealed and not, speaks its own set of volumes about the desire for quality of care rather than social power.

Beyond all of this, we look to the simplest sort of economics, namely, the pricing of various treatments for ailments. Maintaining the cartel's membership systems is a step toward this, along with, of course, the ability to grant and withdraw facility or potential facility licenses to cooperate. Yet in a more visceral way, the state of modern healthcare seems to face an impossibility, where two massive and powerful groups have not come to a clash. An insurance industry, along with the mechanical providers of care, are at seeming odds over the issue of pricing, whereby the insurance industry's massive capital, legislative and judicial purchasing power, and immense reach seem impossibly stymied by this comparatively small band of rogue mechanics. We have not seen, say, an insurer establishing (and suing for the right to run and maintain) its own schools, service facilities, pharmacies, et cetera, such that a drastic cost reduction could be effected. By founding a township, cooperating with some unrelated industry to provide jobs, and buying relevant local legislation, such an insurer could achieve care and care-providers that offered dollar-drugs and twenty bucks for a brief annual consultation, mostly headed by nurses paid $54K a year for three patients an hour. Aside from such speculation, and presuming the accuracy of all arguments about possibility and access potential, an insurer could, with sixty million consumers on its rolls, demand lower pricing, threatening to sponsor relocation costs for physicians willing to defy pricing arrangements, or choose other providers--who, for sixty million roughly guaranteed consumers, would respond--to vend their offered services. Even if all realism about opening its own hospital and subsidiary clinics in a company town were dismissed, an insurer could, at the least, gather a panoply of sob stories, sponsor articles and posters, approach a local legislature, and achieve in totally open ways comparable results of paying less per service.

And yet, insurers have not done so. Like bought boxers struggling not to take a dive too fast, insurers have "negotiated" in a way that pays extravagantly for even simple procedures, uniting across corporate faces to maintain ridiculously high pricing levels. Insurers could partner with the government, using nationwide legislation to become subsidiary sole providers of a national insurance system, and they have the cash to overrun the staunchest of Congresspeople, should they wish to control the entire industry. This seeming battle of giants has never materialized, as though a billions-dollar industry seeking profit is unaware of its own potential gains and current losses; insurers relentlessly agree to pricing schemes which take into account staff and facilities costs in want of an extreme challenge, often requiring paid referral appointments for conditions that Google already understands, and accepting the costs of a pricier business model even decades after the advent of a publicly-accessible healthcare-internet that should have shattered any final pretense at mysterious knowledge. Amazingly, after self-diagnosis became nearly as accurate for the illiterate and their helpful friends investigating minor conditions, provider rates have become more expensive, provider status equally costly, and the insurers--who supposedly pay for this all--remained silent.

The answer to the conundrum, like all the other heads of the monstrous death-machine which wraps about the post-industrial world, is found in the joint ownership of provider and insurer. Insurers make a profit, and pay so eagerly, because they are paying themselves. Competition only makes a pretense at existing, while in actuality it doesn't exist, because the system's feigned privacy makes it immensely more profitable, right now, than a feigned nationalization. By owning both payer and provider, a deceit is orchestrated whereby a common consumer pays a false ally to get the best deals by being taxed for maintaining atrociously high costs for an undying killing machine. This perspective seems science fiction in times of health, while merely tithing operational machinery for others' care based on promises of you being cared for, but when combined with closer acquaintance through employment or aging, and it takes months to find the right operation for which to pay cash for a procedure of ultimate importance, the careless features of the system can be better discerned, and all the soothing promises of paying now for care later become, like crumbling old age pensions, more honestly viewed.

Fiscally empowering a government to, say, take serious action on a health issue (say, mandatory housing for eliminating optional hyper-obesity), or have more MRI machines around, would be not only a civic positive, and a modern national prerequisite, they would be vast enough in scope to serve themselves as a primary issue. In truth, such fringe benefits would only be of secondary consideration when compared to the end to price-gouging and innovation-hampering that such a takeover would entail. Indeed, ending cartel tyranny would be so immensely profitable in tertiary issues that, besides securing discarded lives, such a revolution would "pay for itself" at least a hundred times over.

Friday, January 26, 2018


Mizrahi Jews evicted from homes to make way for Ashkenazi "Jews."

None of the megapolitics, the history, of this place can be understood without taking something into account. What is that something? Amazingly, it is not Europeans. Perhaps more amazingly in the past century, it is not Jews. The labels change. For the past several centuries, it has been documented as Jews, as extravagantly as anything has been documented, speaking weightiest even through the desiccated wrecks of censored history. Even that takes religious stupidity to not see; to alternatively theorize; to be currently faithful and publicly good.

There is certainly some relationship between various masks and various happenings, even a determinative one over many recent centuries. If we can do it without becoming angry and/or upset beyond comprehension, that's verifiable by a few thousand years of what we have. Yet incomplete. The gradations are too nuanced to be externally understood. Anger at dispossession by unclean hordes has been directed by Jews at Jews, whether mini or ongoing. Intra-Jewish, historically often, defied by temporary lulls for outward-focused unification, which historically appear more expedient than they do cohesive. To what extent history is a genetic competition, we're too simple to understand. When one group knows that another must go, and makes it happen, we can no longer say why, if we even remember.

What we now call Ashkenazi were not there always, so the impetus is not primarily Jewishness, but a strain that currently and temporarily wears that mask. Seeing the mask is a massive accomplishment, perhaps beyond many people, but this has persisted for so long because it is more complex than a minority of a minority can see.

Trans Blurb

The comparison here is strong between trans issues and queer; trans people want to adopt the restrictive labels ("man" and "woman") that they feel don't respectively fit some part of them. By so doing, they rightly offend many people who self-identify with those labels, because those people feel that their "born as" identity deserves a categorization separate from a "transitioned to" identity, and they feel--again rightly--that not being allowed to self-identify as their own distinct group is an attack on their identity. "Born as" women realize that all the aspects of womanhood that involve being "born as" will be marginalized, once that part of the definition disappears to make room for "transitioned to" women. When the fight is won, the only place trans people will be is inside the same two-party prison they were in before...and during the fight, their demands for equality over traditional labels reinforce the very labels that caused the problem in the first place. What happens when the multigender people want to self-identify as something other than a man or a woman? Transsexual insistence on being either a man or a woman has just made it that much more difficult for mainstream society to accommodate Neo-Reformed Newhalfism--thanks a lot.

The pursuit of tradition, even under the banner of destroying tradition, validates that tradition. Gay marriage, too, takes an inane western legal contract designed to stigmatize non-participants, and makes it stronger, more expensive, and more pervasive by pursuing the very same horrid state property regime, simultaneously offending those who felt validated by self-identifying with what they saw as the "traditional definition," while entrapping current and future homosexuals in the same network of restrictive expectations that previously assisted in the creation of bathhouse raids. The chance to forge a new path, and free untold millions from future shackles, is cast aside, in favor of the short-lived fun of getting to apply old paint to new furniture.

Like Goldman Sachs' genuine commitment to diversity in its cast of world-rapers, the great arc of Western Sexuality Related Revolutions has proven to be another game of musical chairs. A lot of people have been offended along the way--and given a harder opinion of the supposedly deviant than they may have had before--but to hell with them, right?

Sunday, January 21, 2018

Upgrading Morality, Part 2

Part 1.

Issues of sexual behavior are very like issues of entitlement income, for they represent a virtual schism of responsibility versus welfare; an MMORPG for us to explore move and counter-move between our deepest convictions upon duty and freedom. The libertardian aspect is again present, and again laughable, for the manchild sees no problem with an endless free-ride, glutting oneself on the resources of a reproductive society while poopdicking nauseous cul-de-sacs of disease and brokenness, as though it doesn't matter. A majority of concessions of or to homosexuality these days tend to follow this line, severing the trans-individual nature of the person in society. A pro-homosexual, for example, tends to take modern civilization for granted, assuming that the morality of homosexuality can be considered in full severance from the necessity of its roots. For example, modern homosexual-apologists tend to phrase their scenarios of all types based on the assumption that reproduction will continue, and society not become a refuge solely of aging non-reproducers, which would result not only in the death of said aging non-reproducers, but perhaps more importantly, their unassisted, neglected, bedsoring elder years. "Well, of course somebody's going to have kids," goes the rationale. And those kids will be fed, housed, taught, become experienced caregivers, and then accept virtual currency for caring respectfully for bedridden elders, goes the implied argument. Considering the minor frenzy conjured over aging societies concurrent with immigration scams in recent years (currently c. 2018), the concept of a society even more expressly devoted to not reproducing itself being unconcerned about the annual demographic dynamics of expanding buttfuckery is facetious at least.

Pseudo-masculinist behavioral specifics aside, the prevailing assumptions of homosexual advocacy are similar to those encountered from every individualist-materialist perspective over the ages. Those who choose isolation, celibacy, spinsterhood, et cetera, are similar to modern homosexualist-advocates inasmuch as they presume the existence of a society which will endure and expand in order to give heft to their computerized retirement portfolios. All of the nice things that we may have or expect are, compared to the hypothetical state of nature, dependent upon the production and maintenance of as-yet unborn or unmatured individuals, depending on our predictions of our ability to maintain individualist-materialist enjoyment status.

It is quite disingenuous to discuss the morality of committing any material act, even "eating a chocolate treat every Friday night," severed from the necessary supporting concept of "a cyclically ongoing population." There is a sound planetary morality in a sensationist approach to homosexuality, chocolate-consumption, or opportunistic violent robbery, wherein "take what you can because you can" may be widely presumed unpleasant, but is at least internally consistent. The pro-homosexual assumption, "You will keep having babies who will support my economic needs when I am unable, based on a protracted time-benefit analysis forming an economic system which you will teach them and which they will police for my benefit" is highly problematic. Without it, the discussion could enter different realms, such as, "The voluntary childless participants in a society will pay a social maintenance tax in lieu of their child-raising obligations." Likely there is a strong link between pro-homosexuality and "the state should assume responsibility for raising the next generation" as a misguided attack in the concealed battle over assessment rates, e.g., severing children from parents and attaching them instead to the futuristic superstate, in conjunction with generally-assessed taxes (the much smaller components which can be attributed to helping the members of such society, rather than to other, more tax-essential ends) supporting such state monitoring, establishes trends which, as the years roll by, can be used to produce a much more pro-childless state of negotiation even if such happens within the context of a reasonable society considering the problem caused by homosexuality's reliance on perpetual demographics.

A "free action" approach to homosexuality, without an interest in personally performing or aping confident performance of the said acts, suffers from the same dearth, whether or not it grows more or less intense in its passion. Like chocolate-eating, or any other preference for collecting positive sensations, any presumption of social continuation offers the same taint. "Let them fuck only dudes' asses because I don't care" ignores the necessity of maintaining society as much as does "I'm a dude and I only want dudes!"

Alongside the sexual variety of libertardianism comes its evil authoritarian nemesis, where equally foolish, and often (but not always) curiously intense, faux-ascetics attempt to ban spicy food or the waltz. Mainstream media sex, a.k.a. men having sex with men (MSM), often earns ire quite inappropriately, not for its inability to address or satisfy the sponsorship of a cyclically propagating society, but but for its sheer grossness, which though an easy target, is irrelevant to the question. Any number of examples have been made over the recent years likening the attractiveness of MSM behavior to heterosexual behavior, either for its production of social burdens of various kinds, or the pseudo-insightful meaningfulness of the inherent unpleasantness of ass-filling or its associates. Which is to say, if a fat aging woman has some variety of perverse sex, ends up uncertainly pregnant, gives a certainly expensive birth, then produces either a suddenly- but expensively-perished offspring, or a druggie mugger killed by police at 23, it is as offensive, and more important, far more socially costly, to permit the latter; and yet, the elaborate monitoring that would cause it to never happen has social ramifications that would prove far more harmful to a group's reproductive success. Sowing draconian ground destroys the individual, while fertile ground does not require, indeed shies from, the draconian breeding camp, which is to say that establishing some giant prison camp where people breed beneath posters that scream "Duty!" is far less productive and far more problematic than even today's society, while supporting a couple weirdos' freedom to commit buggery as part of supporting a wholesale fertile society produces net results far greater than an alternative. Indeed, without a hostile media and legislative apparatus, homosexuality becomes, socially, a non-problem, as it was a bit over two thousand years ago. Appeals to Yahweh's morality are ineffective, as it has been changed to correspond to the destruction of other cultures, whereby the mandate on buggery becomes "for" rather than "against."

To join the two sides, or at least effect better heated discussions, we might at once attack sensationalism and irresponsibility. Again we turn to taxes, where the pro-homosexual would need to become a national-natalist in the "old" sense, melding persistent genetic moralities with individual choice, and thereby paying tribute to the font of all material pleasure, while the staunchest anti-homosexual would need to give up the enemy's directives in the Torah, embrace an older national natalism, and remove the metaphorical schnoz from the bedroom.

Tuesday, January 16, 2018


If Stephen Blow has $500,000 in his retirement portfolio and Betsy Gatesbook has $50,000,000, a 90% market loss causes Blow to lose $450 thousand and Gates to lose $45 million. The cost to Betsy appears greater. Since lots of people feel that they're clever investors, assume for the purposes of this example that Blow and Gates are each retiring, facing health problems that leave "door greeter at local megamart" the only real fallback job option, and that their portfolios depend upon professional management at around 100 basis points (1% management fee).

Under these conditions, it first seems like Gatesbook has been hit harder than Blow. The true effects on the portfolios, though, are significantly different. Gatesbook's, upon which she doesn't need to rely anyway after the "market crash," has earnings sufficient to cover its costs, to reinvest itself and continue growing, and to provide for her needs all the while. By contrast, Blow's becomes almost cost-prohibitive, can't afford to reinvest, and has to shed principal for day-to-day survival. While Gatesbook lives off reduced income, Blow is forced to destroy his principal (slowed slightly if he does become a Walmart greeter). Gatesbook's five million maintains her lifestyle, while Blow's fifty grand is a tattered savings account. When the market later "corrects" itself upward, Blow has nothing left, while Gatesbook gets hers all back. The ability to weather cyclic storms stays with Gatesbook, regularly purging all the others. It's very cute to pretend that being a financial whiz can alleviate or eliminate these conditions, but for people never permitted to generate salaries sufficient to build above the washout point, or who get screwed in myriad other ways--including being old and needing to rely upon professional management even if you were a discriminating financial whiz before--the cycle achieves its desired effect, reducing the "middle class" by leaps and bounds.

We've briefly summarized the effects of cyclical raids on the middle class:
Now, consider the middle class family with, say, a million and a half in savings earned over two working lifetimes of scrimping. The stock market drops, and their $900K retirement fund goes down to $500K. The real estate market crashes, and their house goes from $600K to $350K. All of a sudden, their retirement just got a little less easy. Instead of passing on a large sum to their heirs, they use up most of what they have left. Maybe they keep working longer.

Or the family with $5 million, drops to $3. Suddenly, they can’t afford that extra property. They’re not starving, but there’s a world of difference in investment income and future planning. Their ascent toward the top has just been stopped. In a generation or two (or less), they’re off the radar. Their holdings have been dispersed, and are no longer large enough to grow to something meaningful.
The fallout from attacks delivered through financial markets goes far beyond mere investment, spending, and inheritance issues. Businesses which compete with the mainstream are not started (e.g., Dad never starts that Greek restaurant), attempts to obtain significant voting blocs in smaller publicly-traded corporations are stymied, and so forth. More importantly, the washouts raise the prices of many commodities and consumer loans, so lower class transitions to middle class are forestalled at the same time as middle class transitions to upper class. What, to middle class people, is a portfolio drop, becomes the elimination of working savers, such that workers learn that it is unintelligent to save, and better instead to live by debt and employ bankruptcy when necessary. The supposed idiocy of the American consumer is based in large part upon the many washouts of savers over the course of generations, whereby it actually is more rational to waste money on a luxury cruise or a sports car than to buy stock--when you need savings to meet an emergency bill, the market tends to have drastically reduced the value of those savings, so you lose money by not having spent those savings on something frivolous before, then gone bankrupt in the E.R. when the medical emergency hits. The desire to trick working consumers into "saving" and "investing" keeps getting resisted by working consumers, who have to some extent built up an instinctive recognition of the ruse. It is not always their stupidity that causes them to buy a new truck instead of saving for college--inflation washes out FDIC accounts, and market games make securities too risky. Only if you have wealth sufficient to live off income during cyclical recessions are you (potentially, partially, if you're lucky) saved from these effects.

Compare brahmin attitudes toward lower-class "financial responsibility" habits with the same attitudes toward race. Poor blacks know why it is dangerous to have their neighborhood taken over by poor Hispanics, and vice versa, and poor whites know the same for both groups. The middle-class loves lecturing the poor about how happy they'll all be together, and how their racism is all the same, whereas people who've experienced those lives understand that kumbaya is different. Similarly, the brahmin love to plan budgets for the poor.

Genetic Homosexuality

Homosexuality, without germ or gene identified, yet seen as a competitive evolutionarily mandate for members of a group, may be better characterized as a genetic constant: as humans carry the coding for different sexes, with DNA ready to respond to environmental hormones as needed--such that you can shoot a man up with "HRT" drugs and produce predictable results--homosexuality may prove itself to be a similarly adaptable condition, whereby, like rage or bloodlust, it develops in response to environmental stimuli, not as a negative, but as a positive evolutionary response.

A common objection to such a theory would draw its primary proof from its ignorance of scale, whereby the assumption that things meant to be beneficial must conform to a scale of benefits which is severely limited; in this case, such a homosexuality must be individually or socially beneficial within 0-9,999 years. Beyond such a perspective, adaptability can be seen as a benefit.

Sheets and Beds

Bull sheets on a bull bed
Shoot for the moon but hit Mars instead
Mother found her life all twisted and red
God doesn't want you to ask

Kiss my assistant or just shake her hand
Jeans are the #1 pants in the land
Dam the river
Or let it flow
You'll only find silence
If you already know

Wednesday, January 10, 2018

Raw Materials

Viewed from a different perspective than the local one, Earth is a reliable producer of only really one raw material: memories. Heavy metals, scattered "technologies," and ersatz moralities: all inadequate, unreliable, or even harmful at net; Terra is not the place to find these things, except in the form of memory components. Here the primary component is not the heavy elements in question which are themselves being contemplated, but the gravitation-like effects on memories which the said heavy elements exert. E.g., we gather a few billion tons of lead, and are not noteworthy as lead-stockpilers or -producers, but as the accumulated mass of memories pertaining to said lead, such as a million variations on "my cut of this deal'll finally pay for that condo" or "now she'll totally go for me." The details of what might be temporarily "made" from the lead become redundantly silly, compared to what is thought about the lead.

A substantial amount of the hesitation to consider memory a resource is similar to the phenomenon of pigs frolicking and mating near a large deposit of gold. The gold affects their lives, in the sense of forming the mountain around which they frolic and mate, but it doesn't do anything, it's just terra firma, everyone's got it, et cetera--a prospector, by contrast, may view the gold or potential gold in a much different way than the pigs can. "It's that glinty stuff you walk on" is a useful, descriptive thought, in a way, as are the prospector's thoughts about whom he might sell the gold to, as are the scientist's thoughts about in which communications products he might employ trace elements of the gold; granted more intellectual capability than the pig, we may think many thoughts about the gold which are, to the pig, non-thoughts, incapable of understanding, except perhaps as metaphors to something which is understood, such as "it's like a really rich food to them" or "it's like seven fertile sows begging for it all at once," et cetera.

Something of our challenge, here, should we choose to feel it, is to figure out why the accumulation and refinement of memories is of universal "value" in a sense which we can understand. Much as we may view it as random (inexplicable with the load capacity of current available thought processes, spiritually designated as "just happens" because we're not smart enough to figure out why) when heavy elements form, we see our exploitation or potential exploitation of them as not random, e.g., "of course we're going to use that tungsten when we find it," taking for granted our own functions. Our perception of randomness perhaps begins to break here, and we find ourselves in the Calvinistic quandary, wherein we may wonder if it is not foreordained that we should create, say, a reactor out of reactor-capable materials we find. Indeed, we may come to recognize all "our" history as a naturally occurring, non-random material coincidence, in which every decision is part of the preordained plan. Imagination, then, becomes a conduit for musts, as when a simian contemplates striking an enemy not with a fist but with a nearby rock, which would have been impossible without the existences of said nearby rocks. It is not, ergo, an unnatural act to exploit a resource-stuffed planet, refining memories into forms of misery, anymore than it is to cause combustion in dry wood to produce heat. This one would like the freedom to make different choices, but that desire is itself something which can only be produced in response to living within the trap; lighter elements predominate because they must, and without universes constantly expanding and perpetually filled with "lighter" elements, there shall be no "heavy" ones--and there shall, also, be no memories.

Reality appears not a vicious cycle from here, allowing for the ability of future iterations to, with incredible simplicity as we can even imagine it, recast impossibility into mundanity. (For example, a ten thousand year fulfillment-orgasm becomes boring.) Yet it is a burdensome duty to wait for stone to become a potential weapon, to become a potential surgical instrument, to become a potential child's toy, et cetera, whence we discover the duty of creation, and correspondingly the potential exploitation of that resource.

Which is to say, the diseased husk we now inhabit is irredeemable by every local standard we can identify. Its various complicities and stupidities adjudge it succeeded, or as we would now perceive it, failed. Even if some trans-Bajirin force produces a solar-traveling system of twenty-thousand-year colonizers, the fundamental existential conundrums of this place as they stand will still persist, ripe for Jenome and ready to be harvested. Duplicable in form, if not in minuteness, the undiscovered silicon, as it were, remains waiting for a shape. As we would characterize its journey. And that is a hopeful thought.

Tuesday, January 2, 2018

Finitude and Future

This one alluded, in Totality and Copyright, to the method by which reality is created, suggesting the link between creativity and creation (sic). Whether we prefer to assign a religious or spiritual meaning to "creation" as a term is irrelevant; we can substitute "reality" or something which makes a flippant, shameful ("older"?), or benignly ignorant ("younger"?) attempt at aphilosophical thinking if we wish.

Our false humility may be the great characteristic of the current era. We argue that life must terminate with the expiration of the physical form, stating rather loudly that our sensations as-lived are so profound that they cannot possibly be stored or contemplated via any other format. Even "review" is limited to those possessing the dubious honor of being here now, or here then, as the case may be. In essence, we look into the void, and declare, "The experience of being me is so complex that it can only be known by me incompletely while I am here, and approximated incorrectly by those who at least know of the experience of having been here in much the same way that I myself was." An arrogant presupposition to the void, to say the least.

Our firm realism seems founded on the embrace or recognition of the marvels of our current state, and our assurance of our own ignorance. Led by various official churches that have persisted to today (Terra 2018), the greatest ecstasies of the hereafter have flirted with designations of viewing the torments of the non-blessed, which are a visceral series of attempts of avoiding the problem of perpetual existence via vicarious surprise, where a hundred sinners daily greet afresh the soldering irons of a pained immortality for the first time. Ergo we rely not on our own pleasures for happiness, but a vicarious novelty delivered by the freely deserving cattle of suffering. It is, in a way, an easy dogma to critique, for be it a civilization that can transfer between bodies for dire reasons to one that can transfer between body offerings for reasons mockingly not so dire, all provide a window into which the locally dependent material pleasures can be identified, sourced, and found to be perhaps less universal than the stereotypical This Is The Only Planet and it is Flat.

The profundity of our experience has a large part to play in our estimation of future existence. We might have once believed in daily battle, valorous combat, and nightly feasts, and might dress it up with a chance for distinguishing actions, great stories every feast, virginal attendance in later sleeping quarters, and so forth. Yet whatever manifested or derivative immortalities might exist, we see a brighter hope, of sorts, not in the halls of warrior-feasts, but in the hypothetical post-Ragnarok times, where of course god would lie just a little bit about the heavenly pleasures of looking down on hellfire's consumption of flesh, since when he rebooted things there would be real, transcendent pleasures spurred by loftier, less material or temporal minds. Before then, until then, and after it all, our fantasies can be dated and understood. What a terror it is, to recognize those many reflections in the neuralgia that's not there being a prerequisite for participation in the daily battle, for it confines our future to the finitude of our expectation, where children with microscopes that can see nerves and labs that can build them at a farthing per dish of thousands can understand the wishful, incomplete nature of our prior hopes and dreams.

Yes, we can always pronounce transcendence, and lying for your (our?) own good, and save any terrible, terrestrial fantasy thereby. A history of conjoined deceit makes difficult any related embrace of possibility. We cannot take comfort in, say, Allah, given his urgent interests in local arabesques, thousands of years later, should a starfaring civilization be confronted with original texts. And so it is with all fantasies, whereby our current development will eventually provide different focuses, making clear that any divine voice is not particularly genuine, available as it is only through human vessels whose immediate concerns have colored a sizable chunk, if not the totality, of the description.

It remains, though, an act of similar arrogance to discount a potential "afterlife" for reasons that prove themselves to be of similar derivation. Dawkins always beats up the Jesus piƱata at his televised birthday party (local scion of one religion publicly degrading a predecessor) because it is an easy victory, not because it is an epistemological advancement. Our critiques of afterlives, whatever form they might take, are as similarly sourced as what we presume to be our original fantasies in such regard, for we base our denials and refutations on the very humanity that we tend to use to critique the thoughts.

By the same token, though, this occurrence should not validate some form of belief in a fantasy of its own. It is tempting, as a mortal, to witness a bad critique of an immortality, and conclude that, therefore, there is some immortality; whatever the bad critiques, or their majority acceptance by world thinkers, we are not given forever-life in compensation for perception of illogic, nor would we be in a random material stew which had happened to arrange such that it produced said critiques or those like them.

Like a blind fish in the deep waters loves the light, ignorance is the only flavor we know. Not knowing remains of vital importance. Not to confess truth, nor to command humble power, but as purely an observation as something observed, something observing can be, that in this aspect of life, we were designed and grown specifically for such a purpose. There in that place, or here in this one, we can foresee only our own destruction or wishful self-instruction, so incisively that such perception, like a painful end to a series of nightmares, offers severance by seeing--sever me, won't you please, from the idea that there is more after this.